Fire Compartmentation Regulations, Surveys and Common Defects
At 05:51 on 8 April 2017, a member of staff at a care home in Cheshunt rang 999. Asked whether they had evacuated, the caller said they were about to, but residents were still inside.
The fire had started in overheating wiring above a linen cupboard. Nobody could see where it went next. It went up, into the roof space, and raced along the loft above the residents’ rooms. Firefighters carried people down the stairs as the roof fell in around them. Two women died.
At the inquest, the coroner found that inadequate compartmentation in the roof space had contributed to the fire.
That’s the problem with fire compartmentation. It’s invisible. You can see a smoke alarm on the ceiling and an extinguisher on the wall. You can’t see the fire stopping above your ceiling, the cavity barrier inside a wall or the seal around a cable in a riser. You find out whether they’re there on the night you need them.
Look at the major UK fires in this guide and a pattern jumps out.
Almost every one started small. A spotlight pressed against a curtain. Sheets drying over a brazier. A fridge freezer in a fourth-floor kitchen. A can of foam near a projector. What turned them into disasters was where the fire went next. Through a roof void. Up an old ventilation duct. Out of a window and into the cladding. Through a flat door that didn’t close.
Compartmentation decides where a fire goes next.
So here’s a question worth asking.
If a fire started in your building tonight, do you know what’s above your ceilings?
Could you prove it?
Most building managers I meet can’t, and that isn’t a criticism. Nobody shows you. Contractors come and go. Ceilings go back up. Records get lost.
This guide will change that. I’ll explain which compartmentation rules apply to your building and what evidence you should hold. I’ll show you what a compartmentation survey involves and the defects my team finds most often. And I’ll take you through seven real fires, from Whitehall Palace in 1698 to Beechmere in 2019, and what each one means for the building you manage today.
I’m based in Camberley, and most of my work is in offices, blocks of flats and care homes across Surrey, Berkshire and Hampshire. The rules and lessons here apply to buildings anywhere in England, though.
Contents
- What is fire compartmentation?
- Why fire compartmentation matters
- The parts that make compartmentation work
- Which fire compartmentation regulations apply to you?
- The evidence a building manager should hold
- What a fire compartmentation survey involves
- A real survey example
- How compartmentation works in different buildings
- What history teaches us about compartmentation
- Common fire compartmentation defects in modern buildings
- Keeping your compartmentation effective
- Where fire compartmentation is heading
- Frequently asked questions
- Getting help with your compartmentation
What is fire compartmentation?
Fire compartmentation means dividing a building into fire-resisting sections. Each section is called a compartment. Each one is built to stop fire, smoke and toxic gases getting into the next.
You’ll often hear it called fire compartmentalisation. It’s the same thing. Compartmentation is the word used in Approved Document B and most British Standards, so that’s the one I’ll use from here on.
Approved Document B defines a fire compartment as a building, or part of a building, made up of one or more rooms, spaces or storeys. It is built to stop fire spreading to or from another part of the same building, or a building next door.
The simplest way to picture it is a series of fire-resisting boxes inside your building.
If a fire starts in one box, the walls, floors and doors around it hold it in. That buys time. People get time to escape. The fire and rescue service gets time to arrive, find the fire and put it out.
Time is what compartmentation gives you. Everything else in your fire strategy depends on it.
Why fire compartmentation matters
Compartmentation does three jobs. It protects people, it protects property and it protects firefighters.
It keeps escape routes usable
Saving lives is the main reason compartmentation exists.
Smoke kills far more people in fires than flames do. It moves fast. It fills corridors and stairs long before the fire itself gets there. Compartments slow that spread down. That gives people time to reach a place of safety.
Your protected stairs and corridors are compartments too. They’re what make a safe escape route possible. If smoke gets into a stair, the one route everyone relies on can become unusable within minutes.
It limits the damage
Compartmentation also protects the building, what’s in it and the business that runs from it.
The Home Office puts the direct cost of a typical primary fire in a non-domestic building in England at around £124,200. For a fire in a home it’s around £32,400. Those figures are for the year ending March 2020. They’re averages. A serious fire in a warehouse, care home or block of flats can cost many times more.
A fire held in one compartment does far less damage than one that runs through the whole building. You’re back up and running much sooner.
It keeps firefighters safer
Firefighters rely on compartmentation more than most people realise. Their tactics assume a fire will stay roughly where it started and behave in a predictable way.
When compartmentation fails, fire turns up in places nobody expected. Crews can be caught out. So can the people waiting to be rescued.
The parts that make compartmentation work
Compartmentation is a system. Every part has to do its job. One gap in one wall can undo the rest, so it’s worth understanding each part.
Fire-resisting walls and floors
Compartment walls and floors are the backbone of the system. Anything that passes through them has to be protected. That means doors, pipes, cables, ducts and the joints where walls meet floors.
How long a wall or floor must resist fire depends on what the building is used for, how tall it is and whether it has sprinklers. Approved Document B sets the periods out in its tables. Sixty minutes is common for compartment walls and floors in many buildings. Taller or higher-risk buildings may need 90 or 120 minutes. Some smaller, lower buildings need only 30.
A fire resistance rating covers more than the wall staying standing. It also covers stopping flames and hot gases getting through, and limiting how hot the other side gets.
Fire doors
Fire doors are the part of compartmentation most people can see.
They aren’t just heavy doors. Each one is a tested assembly. The leaf, frame, hinges, closer, seals and glazing all work together. As a set, they hold back fire and smoke for a fixed time, usually 30 or 60 minutes.
A fire door only works if it’s shut. It has to close fully and latch on its own, which is why most need a working self-closer. A fire door wedged open is just a hole in the wall. So is one with missing seals or a big gap round the edge.
Grenfell showed how much this matters. I’ll come back to it later in this guide.
Fire stopping and penetration seals
Fire stopping is one of the most important parts of compartmentation. It’s also the part most often overlooked, because once the ceiling goes back up nobody sees it.
Approved Document B says openings for pipes, ducts, conduits and cables through fire-resisting walls and floors should be as few and as small as possible. Every one should be fire stopped. For dwellings, the guidance is in Volume 1, Section 9. For other buildings, it’s in Volume 2, Section 10.
Here’s the problem. Buildings can’t run without pipes, cables and ventilation. To get those services from one room to the next, someone has to make a hole in a wall or floor. That hole breaks the fire resistance of the wall.
Fire stopping fills that hole with a tested product. It puts the fire resistance back.
A penetration seal is the fire stopping system around a service that passes through a wall or floor. It keeps the fire resistance of the wall or floor where cables or pipes go through it.
Cavity barriers
Cavities are the hidden spaces in a building. Think of the void above a suspended ceiling, the space under a raised floor, the inside of a stud wall or the gap behind cladding.
Fire and smoke love these spaces. They can travel along them out of sight and right past the compartment walls below. You’ll see in the case studies that hidden voids feature again and again.
Cavity barriers close those spaces off. They’re normally needed where a cavity meets a compartment wall or floor, and at set distances along long cavities. They’re often missing above ceilings, especially where offices have been reconfigured over the years.
Fire and smoke dampers
Ductwork that crosses a compartment line is a ready-made route for smoke. A common way to protect it is a fire damper. It snaps shut when the temperature rises or when the fire alarm sends a signal.
Dampers need testing to prove they still close. One that has seized up, or was never wired to the alarm, leaves an open path straight through the wall.
Intumescent materials
Many fire stopping products are intumescent. That means they swell when they get hot and fill the gap they’re protecting.
Fire-rated sealants and foams expand under heat to seal gaps and stop fire spreading. Each one is only tested for certain gap sizes and certain types of wall or floor.
Intumescent strips on fire doors and in joints swell as the temperature rises and close the gap.
Pipe collars and wraps crush plastic pipes as they soften in a fire. That seals the hole the pipe would otherwise leave behind.
Which fire compartmentation regulations apply to you?
This is the question I get asked most often. It’s also where most of the confusion comes from.
There are really two sets of rules.
One covers how compartmentation is designed and built.
The other covers how it’s looked after once people are using the building.
They’re different, and you need to know which one you’re dealing with.
Rules for new buildings and building work
The Building Regulations 2010 apply when a building is built, extended, converted or materially altered. Requirement B3 deals with internal fire spread through the structure. That’s the requirement that calls for compartmentation.
Approved Document B (Fire Safety) is the government’s guidance on how to meet Part B in England. It comes in two volumes. Volume 1 covers dwellings. Volume 2 covers everything else. Both set out compartmentation requirements based on use, height and occupancy.
Designers don’t have to follow Approved Document B. They can use British Standards instead. BS 9991 covers residential buildings and BS 9999 covers other buildings. Some projects use a fire engineered approach. Whatever the route, the building still has to meet the legal requirements.
Building control checks the work. That’s either the local authority or a registered building control approver. For higher-risk buildings, it’s the Building Safety Regulator.
These rules ask one question. Was the building designed and built properly? They don’t, on their own, make anyone keep checking the building once it’s occupied.
Product testing and certification
Fire stopping products and systems should be tested to recognised standards. BS EN 1366-3 covers penetration seals. BS EN 1366-4 covers linear joint seals. The results are then classified under BS EN 13501-2.
Here’s the catch. A test result only covers what was tested. That means the type of service, the type of wall or floor, the gap size and the way the product was fitted. Use a product outside that scope and you can’t rely on it, however good the label looks.
Approved Document B encourages third-party certification for both products and installers. A certified installer working to a recognised scheme is much less likely to pick the wrong product or fit it badly. They’ll also leave you a proper record of what they installed.
Rules for existing buildings in use
Once a building is occupied, the main law is the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. It applies to almost all non-domestic premises. It also covers the common parts of blocks of flats and houses in multiple occupation.
The Order puts duties on the responsible person. That’s usually the employer, the owner or the managing agent. They must carry out a suitable and sufficient fire risk assessment. They must also keep fire safety measures, including compartmentation, in efficient working order and good repair.
The Fire Safety Act 2021 made one thing clear. In buildings with two or more homes, the Order covers the structure, the external walls and the flat entrance doors. Those are core parts of compartmentation in any block of flats.
The Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022 added duties for blocks of flats over 11 metres. The responsible person must check communal fire doors at least every three months. They must also use their best endeavours to check flat entrance doors at least once a year. Above 18 metres, there are extra duties around information for the fire and rescue service.
Since October 2023, every responsible person must record their full fire risk assessment in writing, along with their fire safety arrangements.
The Building Safety Act 2022 goes further for higher-risk buildings. Those are buildings at least 18 metres or seven storeys tall with at least two homes. The accountable person must keep a golden thread of accurate building information, and compartmentation is part of that.
Your local fire and rescue service enforces the Fire Safety Order.
- If your building’s in Surrey, that’s Surrey Fire and Rescue Service.
- In Berkshire, it’s Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service.
- In Hampshire, it’s Hampshire and Isle of Wight Fire and Rescue Service.
How the two sets of rules fit together
Approved Document B tells you what good compartmentation looks like. The Fire Safety Order tells you that you have to keep it that way.
Most existing buildings weren’t built to the current edition of Approved Document B. That isn’t a breach in itself. What matters is whether the compartmentation is good enough for the way the building is used today, and whether it’s being maintained.
A fire risk assessor will usually use current guidance as a benchmark for an existing building. Where something falls short, the real question is how much risk that creates. The answer decides what you need to do next.
The evidence a building manager should hold
When I review a building, I ask for evidence. I don’t take assurances on trust, and neither should you. A responsible person should be able to put their hands on most of the following.
| Evidence | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| A current fire risk assessment, recorded in full | It should comment on compartmentation and say whether more investigation is needed. |
| The fire strategy, or as-built fire drawings | They show where the compartment lines should be and how much fire resistance each one needs. |
| Fire stopping installation records | Photos, product details and certificates prove what was installed and who installed it. |
| Fire door inspection records | They show doors are being checked and faults are being fixed. |
| Fire damper test records | They prove the dampers still close when they need to. |
| A permit to work system for contractors | It controls who cuts holes in fire-resisting walls and makes sure they’re sealed afterwards. |
| Previous compartmentation survey reports | They show known defects and whether each one has been put right. |
| For higher-risk buildings, golden thread information | It’s a legal requirement and must stay accurate as the building changes. |
If most of this is missing, that tells you something useful.
It usually means nobody really knows the condition of the compartmentation.
The sensible next step is often a compartmentation survey.
What a fire compartmentation survey involves
A compartmentation survey is a detailed look at the fire-resisting construction in a building. My team inspects walls, floors, risers, ceiling voids, fire stopping, cavity barriers, dampers and fire doors. It goes much further than a standard fire risk assessment.
When you might need one
These are the situations that most often lead a client to call me:
- The fire risk assessment has recommended one.
- There are no records of how the building was built or fire stopped.
- The building has been refurbished, fitted out or rewired.
- New tenants have moved in and changed the layout.
- An insurer, lender or buyer has asked for evidence.
- The fire and rescue service has raised concerns.
- The building is higher-risk and the golden thread needs accurate information.
- The evacuation strategy relies on stay put, and nobody has checked the compartmentation behind it.
When a visual inspection may be enough
A non-intrusive survey is visual. We inspect everything we can see and reach without damaging the building. That includes risers, plant rooms and service cupboards. It also includes ceiling voids through access hatches or lifted tiles, and the faces of walls and doors.
That’s often enough when:
- the building is fairly modern and the records are reasonable;
- the areas that matter most can be reached without opening anything up;
- the aim is to check the condition of known fire stopping and doors; or
- nothing we see suggests hidden problems.
A visual survey has limits, and a good report will be honest about them. It can’t tell you what’s behind a solid plasterboard ceiling or inside a wall. Every area we couldn’t see should be listed.
When intrusive investigation may be needed
Sometimes the only way to know is to open the building up. That might mean cutting inspection holes in ceilings, lifting floor boxes, opening boxing or removing a section of cladding.
Intrusive work is more likely to be needed when:
- the visual survey finds signs of wider problems;
- the building has concealed voids that can’t be reached any other way;
- there’s no information on how the building was constructed;
- the evacuation strategy leans heavily on compartmentation, as with stay put in flats; or
- the external wall construction is unknown or might be combustible.
For blocks of flats, the Local Government Association guidance and PAS 79-2 describe four types of fire risk assessment.
- Type 1 covers the common parts without opening anything up.
- Type 2 covers the common parts with some intrusive work.
- Types 3 and 4 add the flats themselves, first without and then with intrusive work.
Type 1 is the normal starting point. You move to the higher types when there’s a reason to dig deeper.
Intrusive work needs planning. Asbestos has to be considered before anyone cuts anything. Openings need making good afterwards, and you’ll need to agree the scope before work starts.
What you receive
A survey is only worth having if the report helps you act. A report from my team includes:
- a plain English summary of the overall condition of the compartmentation;
- marked-up floor plans showing compartment lines and where each defect is;
- a photograph and unique reference for every defect;
- a description of what’s wrong and why it matters;
- a priority rating, so you know what to fix first;
- a clear recommendation for each item;
- a list of areas we couldn’t inspect, and why; and
- advice on whether intrusive investigation is needed.
We can give you the defect register as a spreadsheet as well as a PDF. Your contractor can price from it, and you can track each item through to completion.
What a report entry looks like
Here’s how each finding is set out. This is an illustration of the format, not an extract from a client’s report.
| Reference | CS-014 |
|---|---|
| Location | Second floor, east core, electrical riser cupboard |
| Element | Compartment floor between second and third floors |
| Observation | Cable bundles pass through an opening of roughly 150 mm by 100 mm. Loose mineral wool has been packed into the gap. There is no sealant, no label and no sign of a tested system. |
| Why it matters | Smoke and fire could pass up the riser into the floor above. That would bypass the compartment floor. |
| Priority | High |
| Recommendation | Seal the opening with a penetration system tested for these services and this floor type. Use a third-party certified installer. Keep the installation record and photographs. |
| Photo | CS-014a, CS-014b |
What happens after the survey
My team doesn’t carry out remedial work. That’s a deliberate choice. It means we have no reason to find more defects than there are, and nothing to sell you once we’ve found them.
Once you have the report, a competent, third-party certified installer does the repairs. Ask them for an installation record for every item, with photos, product details and test evidence.
We can then come back and re-inspect a sample, or every item, to check the work matches the recommendation. The closed-out register goes into your fire safety records. For a higher-risk building, it becomes part of your golden thread.
How compartmentation works in different buildings
Compartmentation does a slightly different job depending on the building.
Blocks of flats
In a block of flats, each flat is normally its own fire compartment. That’s what makes a stay put strategy possible. If a fire stays in one flat, everyone else can usually stay where they are. A full evacuation isn’t always needed.
But stay put only works if the compartmentation works. That means the flat entrance doors, the fire stopping in the risers and the external wall all have to perform. If one of them fails, the whole strategy is in trouble.
Hospitals and care homes
Hospitals and care homes use compartmentation for something called progressive horizontal evacuation. Moving patients or residents downstairs in an emergency is slow and difficult. Some can’t be moved far at all. So the plan is to move them sideways into the next compartment on the same floor, away from the fire.
That plan only works if the compartment walls and doors hold. The Royal Marsden and Newgrange fires below show what’s at stake, and why it’s worth having a backup.
Offices, shops and industrial units
Commercial buildings use compartmentation to protect escape routes and limit damage. It can also protect high-value areas, like server rooms, records stores and plant rooms.
Tenant fit-outs are where I see most problems in commercial buildings. New partitions, ceilings and cable runs often cut straight across the original compartment lines. Nobody checks, because nobody knew the lines were there.
What history teaches us about compartmentation
It’s easy to read about compartmentation in the abstract. The seven fires below make it real. They range from a royal palace in 1698 to a retirement village in 2019. Each one shows a different way compartmentation can fail. After each one, I’ve pulled out what it means for the buildings you manage today.
The Royal Marsden Hospital fire, 2008
The Royal Marsden in Chelsea was the first hospital in the world dedicated to the study and treatment of cancer. Just after 1pm on 2 January 2008, a fire broke out in a plant room on the top floor.
The fire took hold in the roof and spread quickly. London Fire Brigade sent 25 fire engines and around 125 firefighters. It was one of the largest fires the brigade had dealt with that year. The entire roof of the Chelsea Wing burned through and the top floor was gutted.
Smoke moved even faster than the fire. The Intensive Care Unit was one of the first areas to be evacuated. NHS London’s later review found it had filled with smoke within four to five minutes of the fire starting.
Two patients were in surgery when the fire broke out. Staff safely took them off their anaesthetic and ventilators and moved them to the neighbouring Royal Brompton Hospital. Other patients went to the Royal Brompton and to Chelsea and Westminster Hospital. Some walking patients were looked after in a nearby church. Many were carried out on mattresses in near-freezing weather.
Here’s the part that matters for compartmentation. NHS London’s review noted the hospital had always assumed the building was compartmented. The plan was that horizontal evacuation would be enough. In reality, the hospital had to evacuate the whole building. That meant all 78 inpatients and around 120 outpatients.
Staff got everyone out in 28 minutes. Nobody was hurt. The review put that down to excellent teamwork and leadership. It also noted that, like most hospitals at the time, the major incident plan hadn’t considered evacuating the entire site.
The hospital reopened to outpatients five days later.
What this means for your building. An evacuation plan that assumes compartmentation will always hold needs a fallback for when it doesn’t. If your strategy is stay put or horizontal evacuation, ask yourself what happens if smoke reaches the next compartment. Then make sure your staff know the answer.
The Newgrange Care Home fire, Cheshunt, 2017
Newgrange was a care home on Cadmore Lane in Cheshunt, Hertfordshire. It was built in 1996, with two storeys and a roof space above. On the night of 8 April 2017, 35 people were living there. Most couldn’t move without help. Several had dementia. Five were over 100 years old.
In the early hours, electrical wiring began to overheat at ceiling level, in or around a linen cupboard. The fire got into the roof space.
A member of staff rang 999 at 05:51. You can hear in the call how quickly things were moving. Asked whether they’d evacuated, the caller said they were about to, but residents were still inside. Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service arrived at 05:57.
By then the fire was racing through the roof space. Crews from Hertfordshire, Essex and London attended, using 12 fire engines. Firefighters went in again and again in breathing apparatus. They carried residents down the stairs, shielding them from roof debris as it fell. Then the roof collapsed.
Firefighters rescued 33 people. Three went to hospital with burns and smoke inhalation. Two residents, Ivy Spriggs and Daphne Holloway, died in their rooms.
In May 2019, the company that ran the home, Newgrange of Cheshunt Ltd, pleaded guilty at St Albans Crown Court to five offences under the Fire Safety Order. Each was an admission that its breaches had put residents at risk of death or serious harm. It was fined £175,000.
The inquest was held in February 2022. The senior coroner for Hertfordshire found the fire was accidental. He also found it was contributed to by inadequate compartmentation in the roof space, which let the fire spread faster than anyone expected.
The coroner then wrote a prevention of future deaths report to the government. He raised two concerns. Sprinklers aren’t mandatory in care homes, even where residents can’t move without help. A fire investigator told the inquest that both women would very likely have survived if sprinklers had been fitted. And care homes aren’t classed as higher-risk buildings unless they’re at least 18 metres or seven storeys tall. The coroner said that ignores the risk posed by residents who can’t get themselves out.
Ivy’s and Daphne’s families have since campaigned with the National Fire Chiefs Council for sprinklers in care homes. The home was rebuilt. Against the advice of the fire and rescue service, sprinklers weren’t fitted, although the rebuild met the regulations.
What this means for your building. Roof spaces are one of the places I most often find compartmentation missing. Walls that look solid in the rooms below often stop at the ceiling. Above them, one continuous loft runs the full length of the building. In a care home, where residents may need carrying out one by one, the time that compartmentation buys matters more than anywhere else. If you run a care home, get into the roof space and look.
The Windsor Castle fire, 1992
At around 11.30am on 20 November 1992, a fire started in the Queen’s Private Chapel at Windsor Castle. Renovation work was under way. A 1,000-watt spotlight had been left pressed against a tall curtain. The curtain caught fire.
The castle had its own fire brigade of 20 people, six of them full-time, and they were there within minutes. The alarm system showed the fire on a grid map of the castle. First the Brunswick Tower lit up. Then more lights began flashing as the fire spread into neighbouring rooms. Royal Berkshire Fire and Rescue Service was called in.
Why did it spread so fast? The castle had large, connected cavities and voids in its roofs. There were few firebreaks and little fire stopping in those spaces. Hot gases rose into the voids above the chapel ceiling and travelled to the Brunswick Tower and St George’s Hall. A false ceiling in St George’s Hall, and an old void under the floors once used for coal trucks, helped carry the fire further.
Firefighters had to make a hard decision. They created firebreaks at the Clock Tower and Chester Tower. They let the fire vent through the roofs, so it would burn upwards rather than sideways into more of the castle. Around 1.5 million gallons of water were used, drawn from the mains, a swimming pool, a pond and the River Thames.
Meanwhile, staff, tradespeople and volunteers formed human chains to carry furniture and works of art out of the building. Many of the rooms had been emptied for the renovation, which saved a great deal of the collection.
The main fire was out by 11pm. Pockets kept burning into the early hours, around 15 hours after it started.
According to the Royal Collection Trust, 115 rooms were damaged or destroyed, including nine State Rooms. The roof of St George’s Hall collapsed. Restoration cost £36.5 million and took exactly five years, finishing on 20 November 1997. Much of the cost was met by opening Buckingham Palace to paying visitors for the first time.
The castle now has modern fire detection and fire separation throughout. The fire also led to improvements in fire safety at other heritage buildings.
What this means for your building. Voids are where fire goes when you’re not looking. Above your suspended ceilings, under your raised floors and inside your boxing, there may be continuous spaces running right over your compartment walls. A wall that stops at the ceiling grid isn’t a compartment wall.
The Whitehall Palace fire, 1698
Whitehall Palace was once the main London home of the English monarchy. By the late 1600s it had over 1,500 rooms and was one of the largest palaces in Europe. It wasn’t one building. It was a sprawl of lodgings, halls and offices added over 150 years. A French visitor called it little more than a heap of houses.
On the afternoon of 4 January 1698, a Dutch maidservant was drying linen sheets over a charcoal brazier in a bedchamber. She left the room. The sheets caught fire. The flames spread to the bed hangings, then the whole lodging, then the next building, then the next.
Most of the palace was built of timber, and the buildings were packed tightly together. There was nothing to stop the fire passing from one to the next. People trying to rescue their belongings blocked the way for those fighting the fire. Buildings were deliberately blown up to try to create firebreaks.
Historic Royal Palaces records that the fire raged for around 15 hours and was only put out by the middle of the next day. Then a breeze relit the flames in another part of the palace, close to the Banqueting House.
William III ordered Christopher Wren, his Surveyor of Works, to concentrate on saving the Banqueting House. Accounts say Wren had its windows bricked up to keep the flames out. It worked. It’s still standing on Whitehall today.
Almost everything else was lost. The diarist John Evelyn summed it up the next day: “Whitehall burnt! nothing but walls and ruins left.” At least three people died. They were the maid who started it, a guard who burned to death and a gardener killed in one of the explosions.
What this means for your building. Whitehall had no compartmentation at all. Fire simply moved from one combustible building to the next. The one building that survived was the one somebody deliberately sealed. Sealing openings is exactly what fire stopping does in a modern building.
The Glasgow School of Art fires, 2014 and 2018
The Mackintosh Building, designed by Charles Rennie Mackintosh and completed in 1909, is one of the most admired buildings in Scotland. It burned twice in four years. Together, the two fires are a textbook example of how hidden routes defeat compartmentation in a historic building.
The 2014 fire
At 12.27pm on 23 May 2014, a fire started in Studio 19 in the basement. A student was installing a degree show piece made of foam panels fixed to the walls. Gaps between the panels were being filled with expanding foam straight from a can.
The Scottish Fire and Rescue Service later found that flammable propellant gases from the can were drawn into the cooling fan of a projector nearby. They ignited inside it. The projector wasn’t faulty. It was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. It later emerged the school had banned that type of foam.
On its own, that should have been a small fire in one room. It wasn’t, and the fire service report explains why. The building had many timber-lined walls and voids. Its original ventilation ducts ran both up and across the whole building. Some were brick-lined shafts inside the walls. Others were timber ducts fixed to the wall surface. Together they gave fire a network of routes into the studios next door and up through the floors.
The fire reached Mackintosh’s famous library through an old ventilation shaft. The library was destroyed.
A water mist suppression system was being installed at the time. It wasn’t yet working. The school later told MSPs the installation had been held up by funding and then by the discovery of asbestos in 2013.
The 2018 fire
By June 2018, a multi-million pound restoration was nearly finished. At 11.19pm on 15 June, the alarm was raised. The first fire crews arrived six minutes later.
This time the fire was far worse. Half the building was well alight within 38 minutes of firefighters arriving. More than 100 firefighters attended at the peak. The fire also gutted the O2 ABC music venue next door. The Mackintosh Building was left a shell.
The fire service’s investigation was the largest and most complex it had ever carried out. Its report, published in January 2022, found the fire probably started on the east side of the building, on or above the fourth floor. It couldn’t establish a cause. Investigators were working on a dangerous site, sifting through compacted debris up to four metres deep. The cause was recorded as undetermined.
What the inquiry found
In March 2019, a Scottish Parliament committee reported on both fires. It wasn’t convinced the school had given enough priority to safeguarding the building. It found that, before 2014, the school hadn’t specifically addressed the building’s heightened fire risk or carried out an adequate risk assessment. It said the delay in fitting the mist system and the presence of old ventilation ducts made both fires worse. It called for a full public inquiry.
The school’s position was that truly effective compartmentation would have meant stripping the building back to its masonry to find every void. That shows how hard it can be to put compartmentation into a building that was never designed for it.
What this means for your building. Old ducts, shafts and voids that nobody uses any more are still connected to every floor they pass through. If you don’t know where they go, fire will find out for you. Restoration and refurbishment are also a time of high risk, when fire protection is often at its weakest.
The Grenfell Tower fire, 2017
The worst failure of compartmentation in modern UK history happened in the early hours of 14 June 2017 at Grenfell Tower in North Kensington, London. Seventy-two people died. It changed the way the whole industry thinks about compartmentation.
A building designed for stay put
Grenfell Tower was a 1970s concrete block with a single staircase. Like most UK tower blocks, it was designed around stay put. The thinking was simple. If a fire broke out in one flat, the concrete walls and floors and the fire doors would hold it there. Only the people in that flat would need to leave. Everyone else would be safer staying put while firefighters dealt with it.
How the fire escaped
The fire started in a fridge freezer in the kitchen of Flat 16 on the fourth floor. Behailu Kebede, who lived there, rang 999 at 00:54. He warned his neighbours and left. Firefighters reached the tower at 00:59.
Within minutes of arriving, they had put out the fire inside the kitchen. But by then it had already escaped. The fire broke out through the kitchen window and into the cavities around it. By 01:09 it was in the external cladding and climbing the east face of the building.
The cladding had been added during a refurbishment between 2012 and 2016. It was made of aluminium composite material with a polyethylene core. The core burned fiercely. The cavity behind the panels let flames travel upwards out of reach of firefighters’ hoses. The fire then spread around the building and back into flat after flat through their windows.
Compartmentation failed inside too
It’s tempting to think of Grenfell as only a cladding fire. It wasn’t. The Phase 1 report found a total failure of compartmentation, and much of that failure was inside the building.
Most flat entrance doors had been replaced in 2011. Evidence to the inquiry showed many self-closers on those doors didn’t work. The bolts holding them were too small and pulled out under the weight of the door. Some closers had been removed altogether. Post-fire inspections suggested as many as two-thirds of the flat entrance doors had broken self-closers. London Fire Brigade had issued a deficiency notice about self-closers in November 2016.
When people fled their flats, many doors stayed open. Smoke poured into lobbies and the only staircase. Fire safety engineer Dr Barbara Lane told the inquiry that the stair was smoke-logged from 1.40am. The inquiry chair concluded that ineffective fire doors let smoke and toxic gases spread faster than should have been possible.
The firefighting lift didn’t work properly either.
The stay put decision
Stay put advice stayed in place until 2.47am. The Phase 1 report found that once compartmentation had clearly failed, the decision to evacuate should have been taken between about 1.30am and 1.50am. It said stay put had become an article of faith within London Fire Brigade.
The inquiry found the external walls didn’t comply with the Building Regulations. Rather than resisting the spread of fire, the report said, they promoted it. That undermined the whole fire safety strategy, including the stay put advice residents and firefighters relied on.
Phase 2
The Phase 2 report, published on 4 September 2024, ran to around 1,700 pages and made 58 recommendations. It looked at how the building came to be in that condition. Among many findings, it criticised the tenant management organisation for failing to set up proper inspection and maintenance of fire safety systems, particularly the self-closers on flat entrance doors. It also questioned the assumption in Approved Document B that effective compartmentation makes stay put the right response in a high-rise residential building.
Grenfell led directly to the Fire Safety Act 2021, the Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022, the Building Safety Act 2022 and major changes to Approved Document B.
What this means for your building. Compartmentation is only as good as its weakest part. Here, that was the external wall and the self-closers on the doors. A broken self-closer looks like a small maintenance job. At Grenfell, broken closers helped turn a flat fire into a building fire. That’s why the law now requires regular fire door checks in blocks of flats.
The Beechmere fire, Crewe, 2019
Beechmere was a large retirement village on Rolls Avenue in Crewe. It housed around 150 older people in their own flats, with care and support on site. It was a timber-frame building and it had no sprinklers.
On the afternoon of 8 August 2019, the fire alarm went off at around 4.30pm. One resident later told Inside Housing she couldn’t believe how quickly the building went up.
It became one of the biggest fires Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service had ever attended, with 70 firefighters at its height. The building was destroyed. Remarkably, nobody was hurt. But more than 150 residents lost their homes and nearly everything they owned. Many were scattered across Crewe, staying with family or in temporary places at other schemes.
Fire investigators said the fire started in a patio area on the roof. Roofing works had been carried out at Beechmere between 6 and 8 August 2019.
A long investigation, and no convictions
Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service spent years investigating. It brought charges under the Fire Safety Order against six companies involved in the design, fire strategy, risk assessment, management, maintenance and roofing work at Beechmere. Among the charges were alleged failures to take measures to prevent the spread of fire, and to assess the risk that LPG torches posed to the timber frame. Others related to companies allegedly failing to co-operate and co-ordinate with each other on fire safety.
The defendants denied the charges. Charges against the roofing contractor were dropped in October 2024 and those against the fire strategy consultant in February 2025. The trial of the remaining four companies began at Chester Crown Court in May 2025. After taking legal advice, the fire and rescue service withdrew its case against all four. No company has been convicted of any offence in relation to the fire.
The investigation did lead to change, though. The service found what it considered breaches at Hazelmere, another retirement village in Winsford. Remedial work has since been carried out there and at the other “mere” retirement complexes in the area that were built to the same design. The service says fire safety at four similar premises across Cheshire has improved significantly as a result.
Why Beechmere matters for compartmentation
We don’t have a published finding on exactly how the fire spread through Beechmere, so I won’t speculate. What we can say is that timber-frame buildings depend heavily on cavity barriers and fire stopping inside the walls and roof. When those are missing or badly fitted, a fire that gets into the structure can travel through the frame itself. Investigations into other timber-frame fires have often found exactly that.
What this means for your building. If you manage a timber-frame building, the compartmentation is mostly hidden inside the structure. You’ll only know it’s there if someone checks. Hot works like roofing need careful control, a proper permit and a fire watch afterwards. And where several organisations share responsibility for one building, everyone needs to know who’s checking what. Finally, if one building has a problem, look at every other building built to the same design.
The common threads
Put these seven fires side by side and the same patterns keep turning up.
Hidden voids and cavities let fire spread out of sight at Windsor Castle and the Glasgow School of Art. At Newgrange, the coroner found inadequate compartmentation in the roof space contributed to the fire. Every void in a building needs proper fire stopping or cavity barriers.
Old ventilation systems carried fire through the Mackintosh Building. Services designed without fire safety in mind can become highways for fire. They need checking and upgrading.
Combustible materials, from the timber of Whitehall Palace to the cladding at Grenfell, made fire spread much faster once it got going.
Building work and restoration weakened fire protection at Windsor, Glasgow and Grenfell. Every change to a building needs checking against the fire strategy.
Small maintenance failures mattered hugely. Broken door closers at Grenfell and a suppression system that wasn’t finished in Glasgow both played a part.
The people most at risk are often the least able to escape. At Newgrange, the Royal Marsden and Beechmere, many occupants needed help to get out. That makes the time compartmentation buys even more valuable.
Building work can bring its own fire risk. Restoration was under way at Windsor and Glasgow when fire broke out. At Beechmere, roofing works had taken place in the days before. Hot works and contractors on site need tight control.
And plans that assumed compartmentation would hold were tested hard. The Royal Marsden and Grenfell both showed what happens when it doesn’t.
These fires are the reason today’s rules exist. They’re also the reason regular checks by a competent person matter so much.
Common fire compartmentation defects in modern buildings
Most compartmentation doesn’t fail because it was badly designed. It fails because of what happens to a building over the years. These are the defects my team finds most often.
Unsealed or badly sealed service penetrations
This is the most common defect by a long way. A cable, pipe or duct goes through a compartment wall and the hole is left open. Or it’s filled with the wrong material.
We regularly find general-purpose expanding foam, loose mineral wool, offcuts of plasterboard and standard decorators’ caulk being used as fire stopping. None of them is a tested system in that situation. Some, like ordinary foam, can actually help a fire along.
Fire stopping disturbed by later work
Fire stopping that was right on the day it went in often gets damaged later. An IT contractor pushes a new data cable through an existing seal. A plumber cuts a hole for a new pipe. Nobody reinstates the seal, because nobody told them to. This is exactly why permits to work matter.
Products used outside their tested scope
A product can be a genuine fire stopping product and still be wrong for the job. It may be used on a bigger gap than it was tested for, on the wrong type of pipe or in a wall it was never tested in. The label alone doesn’t make it compliant.
Missing cavity barriers
Cavity barriers are often missing above suspended ceilings, especially where partitions have moved. A wall that stops at the ceiling grid isn’t a compartment wall. The void above it lets fire and smoke pass straight over the top. Windsor Castle is a reminder of where that leads.
Fire doors that don’t work
We see doors that don’t close or latch. Others have closers removed or disconnected. Intumescent strips and smoke seals are missing or painted over. Gaps are too large. Some doors have the wrong hinges, locks or glazing. Plenty are propped open. A flat entrance door swapped for a non-fire-rated door is a serious defect. After Grenfell, so is a flat entrance door without a working self-closer.
Fire dampers that have never been tested
Dampers are often hidden in ceiling voids with no access panel. Many haven’t been tested since the day they were fitted. Some are disconnected from the fire alarm. Others are jammed open by debris.
Compartment walls breached during fit-out
Refurbishment often cuts new doorways, hatches, glazed panels and service routes into compartment walls. Usually nobody checks whether that wall was part of the fire strategy.
No records
Many buildings have no record of where the compartment lines are, what fire stopping was installed or who fitted it. Without that, nobody can say whether the compartmentation is good enough. That includes you, your insurer and the fire and rescue service.
Keeping your compartmentation effective
Compartmentation only works if someone looks after it. It should be reviewed as part of every fire risk assessment.
As a building owner or manager, make sure that:
- fire doors are inspected regularly and faults are fixed;
- penetration seals stay intact;
- any change to the building is properly fire stopped;
- contractors work under a permit to work system that covers fire stopping;
- fire dampers are tested at the intervals the manufacturer and relevant standards recommend;
- records of fire stopping and fire door work are kept up to date; and
- staff understand why fire doors must be kept shut.
For penetration seals, the ASFP guidance document TGD 17 and the BESA SFG20 maintenance standard are both good references for inspection and maintenance.
For timber fire doors, BS 8214 is the code of practice. It covers installation and maintenance.
Where fire compartmentation is heading
Buildings are getting taller and more complicated, and the rules keep changing with them.
Recent changes to Approved Document B have brought in new requirements for residential buildings. New blocks of flats over 11 metres now need sprinklers. New residential buildings over 18 metres now need a second staircase.
The Building Safety Act 2022 has made building owners responsible for keeping accurate fire safety information throughout a building’s life. For higher-risk buildings, that includes detailed records of compartmentation.
The direction is clear. Saying the building was built to the rules is no longer enough. Owners and managers are expected to prove the compartmentation is in place today, with evidence to back it up.
Frequently asked questions
Is fire compartmentation a legal requirement?
Yes. For new building work, the Building Regulations 2010 require it.
For existing buildings, the Fire Safety Order requires the responsible person to keep fire safety measures, including compartmentation, in efficient working order and good repair.
Is compartmentation the same as compartmentalisation?
Yes. They’re two words for the same thing. Compartmentation is the term used in official guidance.
Does a fire risk assessment cover compartmentation?
A fire risk assessment should comment on compartmentation.
Usually that’s a sample inspection of what the assessor can see. It isn’t a full survey.
If the assessor finds problems, or can’t see enough to reach a view, they should recommend a compartmentation survey.
How often should compartmentation be checked?
It should be reviewed at every fire risk assessment, and after any work that affects walls, floors, ceilings or services.
Fire doors and dampers need their own regular checks.
A full survey makes sense when there are no records, after major refurbishment or when your fire risk assessment asks for one.
Who can carry out a compartmentation survey?
It should be a competent person with the knowledge and experience to judge fire-resisting construction. Independence matters too. A surveyor who also sells the repairs has a conflict of interest.
How long does a survey take?
It depends on the size of the building, how easy it is to get into the voids and whether intrusive work is needed. A small office might take a day. A large block of flats or a hospital might take several days or more.
Getting help with your compartmentation
Good compartmentation needs expert knowledge, competent installation and regular checks. Whether you look after a block of flats in Guildford, an office in Reading, a business park in Farnborough or a care home near Camberley, keeping on top of it takes ongoing professional support.
ESI Fire Safety is based in Camberley, a few minutes from Farnborough, and we have an office in Reading too. I lead a small in-house team that carries out compartmentation and fire stopping surveys. We don’t subcontract the work. We don’t carry out repairs either, so there’s no vested interest in what we find.
We also carry out fire risk assessments and fire door inspections. Our wider fire safety consultancy covers commercial property, workplaces, blocks of flats and residential accommodation.
Many fires start from electrical faults. My background in electrical safety means my team pays close attention to how electrical installations and compartmentation interact. Cable routes are where much of the damage to fire stopping happens.
If you need a fire risk assessment, a compartmentation survey or advice on maintaining your fire stopping, call 01276 300351 or email office@esifiresafety.co.uk. You can also read more about my compartmentation survey service.
Wrapping Up
Most people who use your building will never notice its compartmentation. That’s fine. It’s still one of the most important systems protecting their lives and your property.
You can improve safety and stay compliant by doing three things. Know which rules apply to your building. Hold the evidence. Get the compartmentation properly checked.
Almost every fire in this guide started small. A curtain, a sheet, a fridge, a can of foam, some overheating wiring above a linen cupboard. What turned them into disasters was what happened next. Good compartmentation is what decides that.
The buildings my team surveys range from listed properties to brand new developments. Every one of them depends on compartmentation that works.
Contact ESI Fire Safety today to find out whether yours will hold when it matters.